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Abstract—Real-world data collection poses an important chal-
lenge in the security field. Insider and masquerader attack data
collection poses even a greater challenge. Very few organizations
acknowledge such breaches because of liability concerns and
potential implications on their market value. This caused the
scarcity of real-world data sets that could be used to study insider
and masquerader attacks. Moreover, user studies conducted to
collect such data lack rigor in their design and execution. In
this paper, we present the methodology followed to conduct
a user study and build a data set for evaluating masquerade
attack detection techniques. We discuss the design, technical, and
procedural challenges encountered during our own masquerade
data gathering project, and share some of the lessons learned
from this several-year project.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lack of large-scale, real-world data has hindered the de-
velopment of effective intrusion detection systems for the
detection of insider attacks. Most organizations that undergo
such types of attacks prefer not to announce them publicly
out of liability and confidentiality concerns. According to
the 2010 cyber crime watch survey, which was conducted
by the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and
which surveyed 523 security executives and law enforcement
officials, 72% of the insider incidents that occurred at the
surveyed isntituions were handled internally without legal
action or the involvement of law enforcement [6]. Another
13% of the insider incidents are handled internally with some
legal action. Announcing such attacks may also have market
share implications. For the same reasons, they are even less
likely to share real-world data that could be used to study such
attacks with the research community.
The study of masquerade attacks, a class of insider attacks
in which a user of a system illegitimately poses as, or assumes
the identity of another legitimate user, suffers similarly from
the scarcity of real-world data, despite their significance. Ac-
cording to the 2010 cyber crime watch survey [6], 35% of the
surveyed executives and law enforcement officials experienced
unauthorized access and use of their information, systems,
and networks. This type of intrusion, known as a masquerade
attack, was second in the top five list of electronic crimes
perpetrated by outsiders after virus, worms and other malicious
code attacks.
In the absence of a real-world data set for the study of
masquerade attacks, we had to launch our own data collection
project. In this paper we present the procedure followed to
gather our own data set for the evaluation of masquerade
attack detection techniques. We describe the methodology for
conducting a user study where we collected masquerader data
and tested a hypothesis that malicious masqueraders exhibit a
different search behavior than that of normal legitimate users.
We discuss the challenges encountered during the collection
and analysis of the data set.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we describe the objectives of the masquerade attack
data collection project. Section III covers the methodology
for designing a user study. In Section IV, we describe the
procedure followed during the execution of the user study or
capture-the-flag exercise. In Section V, we present the lessons
learned throughout the masquerade data gathering project.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper by summarizing the
main points of the paper.
II. PROJECT OBJECTIVES
In the case of masquerade attack detection, most detection
approaches used machine learning techniques to profile normal
user behavior, and detect abnormal behavior that could be
indicative of a masquerade attack. The vast majority of these
techniques were evaluated using the the Schonlau dataset [11],
gathered by Mathias Schonlau [2]. This dataset suffers from
several shortcomings. The first shortcoming is the absence of
any command arguments. Only simple commands have been
collected. Another weakness is the lack of timestamps that
indicate when the user commands were issued. No indication
is available as to what time period is covered by the 15,000
commands collected from each user. It could take one user
a few days to issue this number of commands, when it
takes another a few months to do the same. This indicates
another shortcoming of this dataset, namely the heterogeneity
of the users. Not all users have the same expertise with Unix
commands, nor do they have the same job functions. The wide
variety of backgrounds amongst the users causes differences
in their behaviors, such as the variety of commands that they
use.
While all of the above shortcomings of the Schonlau dataset
are important, perhaps the most significant weakness of this
dataset is the lack of real masquerader data. All of the user
command sequences gathered in this dataset were issued by
normal users performing their regular day-to-day jobs. No
command sequences were issued by attackers. Masquerade
attacks were simulated by randomly inserting excerpts of com-
mand sequence from one user into the command sequences
issued by another user. This practically turned the masquerade
attack detection exercise into an author identification exercise.
The fact that the command sequences belong to users with
widely varying Unix proficiency and different job description
further weakens the accuracy results achieved by the proposed
“masquerade attack” detection classifiers, which have been
only evaluated in an “author identification” exercise.
In order to overcome these weaknesses, we launched an
initiative to collect our own dataset for masquerade attack
detection and to make it available for the broader research
community. We call this dataset the RUU (Are You You?)
dataset [1]. The dataset exceeds 10 GBytes in size. The data
collection tasks consisted of gathering computer usage data
belonging to a large homogeneous set of normal users, and
simulating masquerader attacks in a capture-the-flag exercise.
The threat model considered assumes that the masquerader
attackers are not familiar with the file system under attack.
In the next sections, we describe the steps taken to design
and execute the capture-the-flag exercise. This exercise served
two goals: (1) collecting simulated masquerader data, and (2)
testing a hypothesis related to masqueraders’ search behavior.
In the following section, we describe the design aspects of
the user study in order to test our hypothesis, while collecting
quality data.
III. USER STUDY METHODOLOGY
The first step in designing a user study is to state the
hypothesis that is to be tested empirically. This also requires
identifying the null hypothesis which is to be rejected by the
experiment. The goal of our first user study is to show that
the intent of a masquerader can be manifested in their file
system search behavior. Our experimental hypothesis states
that if the intent of the masquerader is malicious, then they
will engage in a significant search activity on the victim’s
system. Our null hypothesis states that the manipulation of
the masquerader’s intent does not have any significant effect
on the the masquerader’s search behavior. In other words, the
observed significant effect on search activity that gets observed
during the experiment can be attributed to the manipulation
of the masquerader’s intent, and cannot be the result of pure
chance.
A. Experimental Variables
Stating the experimental hypotheses also requires identi-
fying the experimental variables: the independent variable,
the dependent variable, and any confounding variables. The
independent variable is the one variable that gets manipulated
by the researcher, while all other are kept constant. The
dependent variable is directly and tightly dependent on the
independent variable. It is the observed behavioral feature to
be measured by the researcher during the experiment.
We hypothesize that user search behavior is a behavioral
feature that is impacted by the user’s intent. If a masquerader
is looking to steal information, their intent will be manifested
in their search behavior through the volume of the search
activities performed by the masquerader. Our goal was to
confirm this conjecture and to show that the attacker’s search
behavior is different from a normal user’s search behavior, and
that monitoring search behavior could be used for the detection
of a masquerader’s attack.
So the masquerader’s intent constitutes the independent
variable in our experiment. The dependent variable in our
study is the search behavior of the masquerader, and their
search volume in particular. Confounding variables are random
variables that could affect the observed behavioral feature,
namely search, such as problems with the experimental equip-
ment or skill level. These variables are to be minimized if not
eliminated. We address the approach that we have taken to
limit them in subsections III-C and IV-C .
The question then is how can we manipulate an attacker’s
intent in this user study? This is by no means a simple task.
However, it can be achieved by crafting different and detailed
scenario narratives that are handed to the participants in the
experiment.
B. Scenario Narratives and Control Groups
When dealing with human experimental design for cyber-
security studies, the scenario narratives should give the exper-
iment participants detailed background information about the
attack and the attacker’s motives. This enables the participants
to play the role of the attacker described in the experiment,
and assume their intent.
We developed a very specific attack scenario that described
the masquerader’s motives and the surrounding conditions of
the attack. The masquerade attack scenario had to be:
• Representative of masquerade attacks, i.e. generalizable:
When conducting a cybersecurity-related user study, it is
very expensive to test all attack variants both in effort
and time. Testing each attack variant requires recruiting
an additional number of human subjects to participate in
the experiment. Therefore, it is very important that the
scenario narrative used in the study is descriptive and
representative of the attack under study.
• Conforming to our threat model: Gathering quality data
which can be effectively used for empirically testing
the experimental hypothesis requires that the scenario
narrative used in the user study accurately reflects the
threat model.
• Easily executable in a user study: This means, for in-
stance, that the execution of the masquerader scenario
had to be time-limited. Not specifying a time limit
for the attack adds a lot of uncontrolled variability to
the experiments. Furthermore, it makes the experiments
costly both in participants and researcher time.
• Detailed: The scenario narrative should be as detailed as
possible. Answers to anticipated questions that could be
posed by the participants should be included. Giving the
answers to these questions to the participants in advance
reduces the needs for asking such questions, and therefore
limits the verbal communication between the researcher
and the participant. Furthermore, it ensures that all partic-
ipants receive the same instructions, therefore minimizing
the participant bias.
In our attack scenario, the masquerader gets an opportunity
to access a coworker’s computer during a 15-minute lunch
break, while the coworker leaves the office and stays logged
in to their computer. We described the financial difficulties that
the masquerader was going through, and the personal conflict
that they had with the coworker. The attacker’s objective was
to find any information that could be used for financial gain.
We strove to ensure that the task of the user study participants
was goal-oriented, thus revealing the malicious intent of the
attacker.
One may argue that simulating a masquerade attack is not
appropriate, and that it is hard for an innocent student to
act as a masquerader. We argue that, if the scenario of the
experiment is well-written, and with very clear instructions,
the participants in the experiment will follow the instructions.
To this extent, we refer the reader to the very well-known
Milgram experiment, which showed how subjects obey an
authority figure and blindly follow instructions, even when
they contradict their own values and ethics [9].
Besides the ‘malicious attacker’ scenario described above,
we developed two other scenarios: a ‘benign masquerader’
scenario, and a ‘neutral’ scenario. In the benign scenario, the
participants experienced a hard drive failure and could access a
coworker’s computer while their coworker left their computer
exposed for 15 minutes, in order to finish working on an urgent
project. In the neutral scenario, the participants in this scenario
had no compelling reason to access the co-worker’s computer.
They were left to freely choose whether they wanted to access
their coworker’s desktop when the coworker left during a lunch
break.
These scenarios are our means to manipulate the intent
of the attacker. Therefore, we strove to keep all variables
constant including the duration of the experiment, the type
of relationship between the attacker and the victim, etc. We
used each scenario to collect data for a control group against
which we compare the results achieved using the ‘malicious
attacker’ scenario. Table I compares the experimental variables
that we controlled across all three scenarios.
C. Sampling Procedures for Higher Experiment Sensitivity
In order to increase the sensitivity of our experiment, we
had to reduce uncontrolled variability. This in turn requires
controlling user bias which makes up the largest source of
error variance in user study experiments [8]. In behavioral
sciences, there are three different techniques or sampling
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES IN ALL USER STUDY
SCENARIOS
Experimental Variable Value Same/
Different
Scope Local File System of Same
Colleague’s Computer
Environmental Constraints IDS Lab Computer Same
Desktop Configuration Same Recent Documents Same
and Applications
Time Constraints 15 minutes Same
Intent Malicious, Benign, Different
or Neutral
procedures used to reduce subject variability and user bias. The
first and preferred technique is the use of the same subject in
all ‘treatment conditions’ of the experiment, that is in all three
scenarios. This procedure could not be used in our experiment
as it undermined the assumption that masqueraders were not
familiar with the file system under attack. Using the same
subjects in different treatment conditions of the experiment
means that they will be exposed to the file system more than
once. This implies that, in the second and third treatment
condition or scenario, the subjects have prior knowledge about
the file system, which violates the assumptions made in our
threat model. Recall that our threat model assumes that the
masquerade attacker is not familiar with the victim’s file
system.
The second approach and probably the most obvious ap-
proach is to select a homogeneous group of subjects, i.e.
subjects with similar characteristics that are relevant to the
experiment, such as their familiarity with the use of computers,
their ability to search for information in a file system, and their
acuity or sense of cyber-security. Finally, the third approach for
reducing subject variability is the use of several small subject
sets with characteristics that are highly homogeneous within
one set, but widely varying between sets.
We have chosen the second approach, and selected subjects
who were all students at the Computer Science department of
Columbia University, so that they have comparable skills. This
should minimize the variability between subject with respect
to their familiarity with computer usage, and how to search
a desktop in order to steal information, or how to perform a
data theft attack without being detected. This should reduce
confounds and bias in the results of this user study.
D. Power Analysis and Sample Size Estimation
Power analysis is an important step in designing a user
study, which usually gets neglected by many researchers
working on cyber-security user studies. An experiment’s power
is an indication of how statistically significant its results may
be, and it varies normally between 0.5 and 0.9. The higher
the power, the more statistically significant the results are.
The researcher has to determine the desired power of the
experiment, in order to calculate the required number of
samples, or human subjects, needed for each experimental
condition of the user study. Obviously, reaching a higher power
value requires a higher number of samples.
The adequate sample size for the experiment depends on
several parameters:
• Form of the experiment: The number of independent
variables manipulated in the experiment and the number
experimental conditions drive the number of subjects
needed for the user study. The more treatment condition
analyzed, the higher the number of participants needed
in the experiment.
• Hypothesis to be tested and the null hypothesis: This
requires identifying the desired effect size w2 that the
researcher wishes to detect. The effect-size measure is a
measure of the size of an effect in the overall population,
regardless of the specific details of the user study.
• Desired power: Achieving a higher power value for the
experiment results requires a higher number of samples.
A power of about 0.8 seems to be reasonable for human
behavioral experiments [8].
The sampling size n needs to be large enough in order for
the experiment to produce a reasonable accuracy, i.e. to limit
the sampling error. Using a larger sample size may only add
to the recruiting costs without adding more accuracy.
1) Calculating the Effect Size: One way to define the effect
w is through Cohen’s d, which is frequently used in estimating
sample sizes [7]. A lower Cohen’s d indicates the need for
larger sample sizes, and vice versa.
The measure of the effect size is the the standardized differ-
ence between two means. For example, one of the dependent
variables that we measured in our user study is the number of
file touches or accesses by the user. This is a search-dependent
feature that, we conjectured, is dependent on the attacker’s
intent, as can be seen in Figure 1(a).
We measure the population effect size w of this feature
by calculating the standardized difference between means of
file accesses within the malicious scenario population and the
benign scenario population. The standardized difference takes
into account the variability of of file touches from one user to
another.





where µ1 is the mean of file accesses by masqueraders in
the malicious scenario, µ2 is the mean of decoy file accesses
by users in the benign scenario, and σ12 is the standard
deviation based on both user populations of the two scenarios.
Considering the sample sizes s1 and s2 of the two populations






where df1 and df2 are the degrees of freedom in both popu-
lations 1 and 2 respectively, i.e, dfi = si − 1 where i ∈ 1, 2





where yi,j is the number of file touches by user j in population
i.
2) Estimating the Sample Size: Once the effect size has
been estimated and the desired power value determined, the





where φ is known as the non-centrality parameter.
The non-centrality parameter φ indicates to which extent
the user study provides evidence for differences among the
two population means. It can be extracted from the power
function charts developed by Pearson and Hartley based on the
desired power [10]. Using the right sample size is important for
reaching the desired power of the experiment between 0.5 and
0.9). However, increasing the sample size to reach very high
power values beyond 0.9 may be very costly, as it becomes
harder to reach power values beyond that value.
IV. USER STUDY EXECUTION
During the execution of a user study, special care has to be
taken to ensure the validity of the results and the compliance
with institutional policies. Several procedural and technical
challenges could be encountered throughout this process, the
first of which is obtaining institutional review board approval
to perform the experiments.
A. Obtaining Institutional Review Board Approval
The major compliance procedural challenge encountered
during the concept phase of our data collection project was
the IRB process. Obtaining IRB approval to conduct user
studies is a costly process, both in time and effort. During the
IRB process, the research plan and objectives including the
detailed description of the planned experiments are reviewed
in advance in order to protect the privacy rights of the human
subjects involved in the research. This process is required in all
institutions that receive research funding from the US federal
government. It is a lengthy process and may be iterative in
some cases, as some clarifications may be requested by the
IRB. For example, we had to submit the exact text of the call
for participation to students in our user studies. We had to
specify in advance what pieces of data we would collect, for
how many users, and for how long. We did not necessarily
know the answers to all of these questions when we initiated
the IRB review process. In order to continue working on the
project, we had to extend or re-initiate the review processes
on several occasions.
B. Sensor Development and Deployment
To collect masquerader data during the user studies, as
well as normal user data, we developed a first sensor that
gathers user command data, including command arguments
and timestamps. Recall that our objective is to collect a dataset
of Unix and Linux user commands from a homogeneous set of
users and overcomes the weaknesses of the Schonlau dataset.
Several technical challenges were encountered during the
sensor development and deployment phases of the project.
We built a first sensor for the Linux operating system. The
sensor uses a kernel hook to audit all events on the host. It
collects all process IDs, process names, and process command
arguments in real time. The hooking mechanism used is the
auditd daemon included in most modern Linux distributions.
When we deployed the sensor, we could not get enough
adopters. Most students on campus did not run the Linux
operating system on their personal computers. Therefore, we
had to develop a second sensor that runs on Windows systems.
This delayed the project by several months.
We developed a second sensor for the Windows XP plat-
form. The Windows sensor monitors all registry-based activity,
process creation and destruction, window GUI access, and
DLL libraries activity. The data gathered consists of the
process name and ID, the process path, the parent of the
process, the type of process action (e.g., type of registry
access, process creation, process destruction, etc.), the pro-
cess command arguments, action flags (success/failure), and
registry activity results. A timestamp is also recorded for each
action. The Windows sensor uses a low-level system driver,
DLL registration mechanisms, and a system table hook to
monitor user activity. It relies on hooks placed in the Windows
ServiceTable, which is a typical approach used by malicious
rootkits.
In the first data collection round, we had about 15 volunteers
who agreed to install the sensor on their computers and to
share the data collected about their normal activities on the
computer. All of these students were taking the Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) class at Columbia University. This
sample was not large enough to conduct experiments and
achieve results with high statistical significance. Therefore,
we had to collect more data when the IDS class was offered
the following year. Meanwhile we had prepared a second
sensor for Windows Vista. Unfortunately, we realized that
most students have upgraded their operating systems from
Windows XP to Windows 7 directly.
Developing a sensor for Windows 7 required rewriting the
core parts of the sensor, since Windows 7 no longer allowed
placing hooks in the Windows ServiceTable to intercept system
calls. Moreover, the sensor could not run on 64-bit versions
of the Windows operating systems. Even certain updates to
the operating system, such as the Windows XP Service Pack
3 (SP3), which includes security, performance, and stability
updates to Windows XP, caused the sensor to crash in some
instances. This caused our server to lose contact with some
user sensors. The data collected for some users covered only
intermittent periods of time. In some cases, users had to re-
install the sensor. In other cases, users decided to run the
sensor on virtual machines, where the guest operating system
is Windows XP. This posed a data quality issue. User data
collected from virtual machines is only a subset of the user’s
interaction with their personal computer. Therefore, it may
not fully reflect the user’s typical behavior. All these technical
issues posed data sanitization challenges, which we present in
the following section.
C. Reducing Confounds and Bias
Besides reducing subject variability, we strove to reduce
the experimental treatment variability by presenting each user
study participant with the same experiment conditions. In
particular, we used the same desktop and file system in all
experiments. We also ensured that the desktop accessed by the
subjects looked the same to each participant. In particular, we
cleaned up the list of recently accessed documents, and opened
MS Office documents before the start of each experiment, and
automated the data collection and uploading to a file server so
that the data collected does not reside on the desktop used in
the experiment and does not bias the results of the experiment.
Finally, we strove to limit the number for unanalyzed control
factors. For example, we ensured that all the experiments were
run by the same research assistant.
D. Data Sanitization Challenges
When deploying the sensors on users’ personal computers,
each installed sensor was given a unique sensor ID. Data
collected from one sensor was uploaded to a central server
and stored under its own directory. Many users had to to
re-install the sensor due to some incompatibilities with their
operating system. Therefore, data belonging to one user was
stored under different directories. Linking or combining this
data was not straightforward in the absence of any user or
system identification mechanism, other than the sensor ID.
Extensive data analysis was required to find clues that could
be used to link the data collected from one user.
Our sensors provided mechanisms for the users to pro-
tect their private data and sanitize it if they wished to.
Unfortunately, many users did not take advantage of these
mechanisms, either due to laziness, or due to lack of awareness
of the consequences of revealing their identities to the research
and broader communities by sharing their data. It is also
possible that users did not care about the consequences of
revealing their identity when their data was shared. Whatever
the reason was, we had a moral obligation of sanitizing the
data and ensuring that the identities of the students were
anonymized. This proved to be a major challenge because
we did not know the names and user IDs of our users. In
the absence of the list of user names and IDs, we had to
manually review all records of data collected and anonymize
these user names and IDs wherever they showed up, such as
in file or directory names. Inspecting 20 million records was a
very time-consuming process, and the results are possibly less
than fully-satisfactory, as we may have missed a username in
a record here or there.
E. Post-Experiment Questionnaires
Having study participants fill in post-experiment question-
naires is one of the best practices when conducting user
studies. These questionnaires can be used to gather more
information about the users including demographics and skill
levels that could be used for statistical analysis. The researcher
can also use these questionnaires to determine whether the
participants could identify the hypotheses tested in the ex-
periment. Knowing the true experimental hypothesis may
cause some user bias, and therefore impact the results of
the experiment. Some insights into the strategies used by the
attackers could also be learned from the participants’ answers
to these questionnaires.
F. Final Data Set Characteristics
Eighteen computer science students installed the Windows
host sensor described above on their personal computers. The
host sensor collected and uploaded it to a server, after the
students had the chance to review the data and their upload.
The students signed an agreement for sharing their data with
the research community. This dataset reached more than 10
GBytes in size. The data collected for each student spanned
4 days on average. An average of more than 500,000 records
per user were collected over this time. Tables II and III show
two sample RUU records.
The dataset also contains data collected from forty students
who acted as masqueraders in our user study. The normal user
dataset and the simulated masquerader dataset are both avail-
able for download after signing a usage license agreement1.
TABLE II

















Path C:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader
\AcroRd32.exe
Stringreturn shopping list 20091211.pdf - Adobe Reader
PID 1676
PPID -1




G. Summary of Experimental Results
The user studies and data collection exercise described
above were conducted in order to test a conjecture, that
modeling user search behavior can be used to detect masquer-
ade attacks. Another objective of these user studies was to
1More information about the data collected in this user study can be found
at: http://sneakers.cs.columbia.edu/ids/RUU/study.html
investigate whether decoys can be used to dedtct such attacks
effectively as well.
We conducted one experiment where the objective was to
provide evidence for our conjecture that the masquerader’s
intent has a significant effect on their search behavior. We
extracted three features from the data collected in the user
study after experimenting with several features such as the
frequencies of the different types of user actions and applica-
tion events: (1) the number of files touched during an epoch
of two minutes, (2) the number of automated search-related
actions initiated by the masquerader, and (3) the percentage
of manual search actions during the same epoch. Automated
search actions are search actions launched using a desktop
search tool such as Google Desktop Search. Manual search
actions are file system navigation or exploration systems. The
distributions of these features for the malicious, benign and
neutral scenario participants of the user study are displayed in
Figure 1. The experiments demonstrated that the manipulation
of the user intent has demonstrated a significant effect on user
search behavior. Further details about these experiments can
be found in our upcoming paper [5].
To evaluate the role of decoys in detecting masqueraders, we
placed 30 decoys in the local file system of the lab computer
used in our user study. We conducted several experiments
to evaluate the effective placement of these decoys and the
importance of various decoys properties in effective masquer-
ade attack detection. Figure 2 shows the distribution of decoy
touches by user study scenario. One can clearly see that the
number of decoy touches is very low in the benign and neutral
scenarios when compared to the malicious scenario.
Our study shows that, among 40 masqueraders, 17 attackers
were detected during the first minute of their masquerade
activity, while another ten were detected during the second
minute after accessing the victim’s computer, as can be seen in
Figure 3. All masqueraders were detected within ten minutes
of their accessing the system under attack. Details about the
decoy experiments can be found in our decoy placement
paper [4].
Finally, we have also used the dataset and user studies to
show that combining trap-based detection with user behavior
monitoring achieves better accuracy results than user profiling
alone when detecting masquerade attacks as can be seen in
Figure 4 [3].
V. LESSONS LEARNED
During the different phases of the user study, we have
learned some lessons, which we group into compliance-
related, scientific, and practical lessons learned, and share
below:
A. Compliance-related Lessons Learned
• Initiate the IRB review process early: Anticipate future
data and experiment needs of your research project, and
start the IRB review process as early as possible. This
is a lengthy and iterative process, and one may not have
detailed answers to all questions presented in the IRB
protocol in advance. So it is wise to initiate the process
early in case clarifications are requested by the review
board.
• List a larger number of user study subjects in the IRB
protocol than you may need: This number is required
per the IRB protocol and it is hard to judge. It may be
wise to ask for a larger sample of human subjects, so that
the IRB can be left ‘open’ in case one needs to solicit
additional subjects.
• Have user study participants sign waivers: Ensure that
all participants in a user study sign waivers indicating
that they are willing to share their data ‘as-is’ with the
research community: Data sanitization is a major issue
and it depends upon the guarantees of anonymity that
are provided. Subjects in our user study were told about
the data being publicly available, and were provided with
mechanisms to sanitize their own data. However many
have chosen not to do so for various reasons, such as
lack of awareness or laziness.
B. Scientific Lessons Learned
• Identify the independent variable: A single indepen-
dent variable should be identified, and the variables that
depend on it should be observed and measured. The
independent variable is the factor that is controlled by
the researcher in the experiment. Variability in all other
confounding factors should be eliminated or reduced to
a minimum.
• List all the assumptions made about the participants
in a user study: Ensure the assumptions are described
clearly in the user study scenario. For example, does the
participant know whether they are being monitored? Do
they know whether the system is baited? This clarifies the
task for the participants, and limits verbal communication
between the participant and the researcher, thus reducing
user-induced variability. Detailed scenario narratives are
critical in limiting user variability and bias.
• Identify ways for reducing variability and baselining
users: When designing a user study, it is critical to
reduce all source of variability, and especially user bias.
Baselining users is important. For example, when asking
the participants to run a sensor that collects their data, one
may ask them to do so without discussing the purpose
of the sensor. This provides a way to record their user
behavior without any bias at all.
• Perform a power analysis: Conducting a power analysis
early on is important for identifying the desired power
of the experiment, and therefore estimating the required
minimum number of human subjects needed to achieve
that power. An under-powered experiment may lead to
statistically insignificant results.
C. Practical Lessons Learned
• Anticipate the technology market trends: Technology
changes very quickly and users adopt new technologies
fast. Data collection tools or sensors used in a user study
have to follow these trends if the data gathering project
is to span many years.
• Pilot experiment: If possible, pilot the experiment before
conducting the real user study. Besides discovering poten-
tial technical problems, you could receive questions from
the participants that should be answered in the scenario
narratives when conducting a pilot experiment. Again,
identifying these questions and providing answers in the
scenario narratives given to the participants provides them
with the same instructions, and reduces user bias.
• Have participants fill in post-experiment question-
naires: Although this step is not required for the success
of a user study, the qualitative and quantitative analysis of
these questionnaires may lead to some additional insights
about the experiment results.
VI. CONCLUSION
Human behavior is complex and is not easily described
through models. Conducting human behavioral experiments
is therefore very complicated and requires special care and
planning to reduce user bias, increase the sensitivity of the ex-
periment, and improve data quality. In this paper, we presented
a methodology for conducting cyber-security user studies.
We also described several challenges encountered throughout
all phases of our data collection project for the evaluation
of masquerade attack techniques, including data sanitization
challenges. We highlighted some lessons learned throughout
the project that could serve as guidelines for researchers doing
user studies in the same field. We believe that user studies,
require extensive planning. Many stakeholders are involved,
including the IRB. Many sources of variability should be
controlled or eliminated, and special efforts are required to
reduce user bias and protect user privacy.
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